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Introduction
In recent years the geography of public investment has gained renewed attention. Public investment affects the regional economy in two ways. The first is the short-run effect; an increase in public investment directly and indirectly stimulates economic growth. The second is the long-run effect; public investment creates public capital which provides the economy and society with the necessary infrastructure and upgrades both the social wellbeing and the development potential of the territories. Classical writers (Buchanan, 1949 (Buchanan, , 1950 (Buchanan, , 1952 Scott, 1952; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972 Oates, , 1998 Samuelson, 1954; Tiebout, 1956; Hirschman, 1957) and more recent advances in empirical work have given prominent position to the role of public investment in economic development (Bennett, 1980; Heald, 1994; Aschawer, 1989) . This is why the geographical dispersion of public investment has taken on a renewed political salience for many governments in the contemporary public policy debate (Heald and Short, 2002:714) . The key objective of the paper is to address comprehensively the regional funding patterns of different governments of the period 1976-2005 and also to consider some plausible explanations for such changes. Despite some earlier work on public investment expenditure in Greece (Psycharis, 1990 (Psycharis, , 1993 (Psycharis, , 2000 Lambrinidis et al.,1998; Rovolis, 1999; Lambrinidis et al., 2005; Mpistikas, 1985; Petrakos and Psycharis, 2004; Georgantas, 2004, Psycharis and Monastiriotis, 2007) , this is the first time that the regional distribution of Greek public investment is examined in such detail and for such a long time-period.
Geography of Public Finance in Greece: Data issues and sources
Research into the geography of public finance is not at all a straightforward issue. There are tremendous methodological problems when the scale of analysis is changing from the national to a sub-national level. Decisions over a number of issues are of crucial importance for the foundation and limitations of the analysis. Problems involved include, among others, decisions over the determination of the periods, the geographical scale of analysis and on manipulation of statistical data.
Choice of one period of time rather than another is of course arbitrary and occasionally confounding issue. Different periods emerge when the analysis is based on economic cycles rather than on political cycles. Hence, decisions over periods are usually determined by the purpose of the analysis. This also has some limitations. Trends on public spending, per example, that have been observed in one period might have started before the period under study.
Another problem is related to the availability of data at the disaggregated geographical levels since usually only a part of the expenditure has a specific geographical orientation. A large amount of public spending remains unallocated, yet this unallocated amount is not at all geographically neutral.
Furthermore, even in cases of geographically identifiable expenditure it is questionable whether these increments 'in' the geographical boundary of the prefectures are also 'in and for' the prefectures.
Concerning the measurement issues it is quite different to construct a geographical pattern of public expenditure based on the volume of public spending rather than on the per capita payments. The later is the most commonly used measure in order to make comparisons. As we will discuss later this also has some limitations. As regards public investment there is also another issue which is related to what we really measure. The evolution of the gross amount of public investment is an analysis of flows, whereas the accumulation of public capital is an analysis of capital formation.
Finally, the coverage and content of public investment in the course of a 30-year period is gradually changing and different types of payments have been included in the public investment budget whereas other types have been removed. These changes impact on the regional distribution to the extent that Prefecture is a key feature of the Greek political, administrative and planning structure and also the base unit for constituencies, with the exception of Attiki and Thessalοniki, which contain five and two constituences each respectively.
In addition, prefectures had been, and to a very large extent still are, the spatial level on which the attention of regional development policy has been focused for many years. Regions which today play an important role in regional policy didn't exist until 1986; they were legislated for in that year, but they didn't become fully functional until after 1997.
Developing such a comprehensive analysis requires access to data sources different from the conventional ones (see Appendix). The starting point of our analysis was the payments made through the State Investment Programme. The
Greek Public Investment Programme (PIP) is part of the Greek Annual Budget;
it forms a very important constituent of the State Budget and, of course, is approved by the Parliament. PIP is the main mechanism for providing the Greek economy with infrastructure, and it also encompasses the structural funding from the European Union.
Data that are used in this study include all payments realised by different tiers of public administration; the national (ministerial) level, the regional, the prefectural, and the local. Such data include public investment in infrastructure for the economy's primary and secondary sectors, payments for infrastructure in the form of roads, bridges, ports, airports and tourist facilities, urban infrastructure (primarily water and sewage facilities and housing), social infrastructure (education and health), etc. To obtain a measure of public investment at constant prices, sectoral deflators were used for the different categories of infrastructure investment. All variables are expressed in EURO and at constant 2000 prices. For every variable there are 1650 observations, fifty-one cross-section observations per year.
The assignment of public investment to different prefectures is not at all a straightforward issue. Regionally allocated public investment accounted for some 55% of total public investment in the study period. The remaining 45%
remains unallocated and could not be assigned to specific prefecture (for the UK experiences see also Heald and Short, 2002:749; Cameron et. al., 2004 ).
This includes inter-regional projects or projects that affect the entire population of the country. The current study is based only on the regionally allocated part of the expenditure (regionally identifiable or regionally relevant expenditure).
The analysis presented below is carried out in sub-periods, each determined by the duration of each government in power. These sub-periods are: 1976 These sub-periods are: -81, 1982 These sub-periods are: -89, 1990 These sub-periods are: -93, 1994 These sub-periods are: -2000 These sub-periods are: and 2000 These sub-periods are: -2004 Table 1 ).
These periods coincide with particular parties' terms in government. Thus, Period I 1976 -1981 , the 'New Democracy' (ND) party, the Conservative Party, was responsible for the country's government. This was also the period of restoration of democracy after the falling of the dictatorship in 1974. The next period begins in 1982 and covers the period 1982-89. This determines the 'Socialists' Era'. During this period, the 'Panhellenic Socialist Movement' (PASOK) was responsible for the country's government .
Over the period 1989 to 1990 Greece was governed by three short-lived governments with limited mandates, one of a coalition between the conservative party of New Democracy and the Left, one caretaker government, and one 'national unity' government in which New Democracy shared power with both PASOK and the Left. In 1990, the ND party won the elections and formed a government. Only from the middle of 1990 through 1993 was the conservative party of New Democracy alone in power but, again, its extremely weak parliamentary majority (of one vote) formed a decisive obstacle to the implementation of policy choices. Internal conflicts within the party led to the collapse of the ND government and a victory in the 1993 elections for PASOK, who also won the 1996 and 2000 elections, returning to power and remaining in power for the entire period 1993-2004 (1993-96, 1996-00, 2000-04) . Finally, the ND party won the 2004 elections and returned to power, remaining in office for a second term after the 2007 elections. Following this introduction, the regional variations in public spending pattern for these periods are presented with an examination of some reasons for these variations. Then, a presentation of summary statistics summarises the persistence and changes of the pattern over time. The final section concludes.
The Geography of Public Finance in Greece by political period
At the outset it is important to emphasize that the most common ranking on regional spending pattern is constructed according to distribution of per capita public expenditure (i.e. Heald, 1994; McLean and McMillan, 2003 
Period 1976-1981, New Democracy party in power 2
In this section stylised facts that have resulted from the analysis are presented in the Table Ia in the Appendix. The analysis is carried out using average public investment expenditure by period. The first columns of this Table shows per capita distribution of regionally allocated public investment over the period [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] . From the bottom line of the Table it place. The prefecture of Fthiotoda, with €101.25, held the 47th place. The prefectures of Imathia, Pieria, Kerkyra, Arta, and Evoia held the bottom ten places in the ranking. All of these ten prefectures received public investment around and below 50% of the national average and were the net 'losers' of that period.
Apart from examining the extreme cases it is worth having a closer look at the prefectures of Attiki and Thessaloniki. These two prefectures include the largest urban agglomerations in Greece, Athens and Thessaloniki. Attiki, which holds Athens, the capital of Greece, receives the lion's share of public investment at nominal values (37,6% of the total), but in per capita terms this prefecture is receiving only 10% above the national average and is holding the seventeenth position in the relevant ranking. Thessaloniki, with per capita public investment 27% below the national average, holds the thirty-fifth position in the ranking. As a general conclusion to the preceding analysis, it could be said that the Conservative governments of that period followed a pattern with a principal aim to directing public investment to the country's industrial poles, such as Voiotia, the adjacent to Attiki industrial 'satelite', and Pella, the adjacent to 
Period 1982-1989, Socialist party in power 3
This period was characterised by the following two elements. Firstly, it was a period when successive PASOK governments were ruling the country . Secondly, structural funding from the European Economic Community, which Greece joined in 1981, strengthened the financing of public investment.
In 1981 a political change came about in Greece when the Socialists won the elections and remained in power almost throughout the decade. In this section the degree to which the Socialists' governments reset the geographical priorities for public investment provision and therefore causing a reshuffling of the ranking compared to the previous period will be investigated.
As can be seen ( Attiki's share in absolute terms was reduced to 28.5% from 37.6% of the previous period. Many of the beneficiaries of the previous period, such as Serres, Pella, Chalkidiki, Ileia, Argolida, all the prefectures of Western Greece (apart from Achaia), as well as Evros, also lost public investment.
In looking for an overall pattern, one might expect that the lower the level of prosperity, in terms of GDP per capita, the higher the level of public investment per capita. Was this system more redistributive when compared with that of the previous period? As Figure 3 shows, although the redistributive curve possesses a negative slope greater than that of the previous period, this slope again is not particularly steep. Hence, redistribution is not on its own a sufficient determinant to explain the reasoning behind the regional distribution of public investments during the period under study. The general conclusion is that again in the period 1982-89, a specific geographical pattern of public investment is not emerging. There is not a clear 'North-South divide', nor an 'Athens and rest of country' divide. Neither 'low density' nor 'low income' seems to carry sufficient explanatory capacity. As in the previous period, there is not again a clear geographical pattern for the distribution of public investment. It seems, however, that important changes have take place in the spatial distribution of public investment, compared with the preceding period. Public spending increased as well as redistribution. The redistribution had also some 'clear' exceptions which were the beneficiaries of the previous period. The 'biased' distribution of funds cannot be examined further in this paper. Indeed, these results are so interesting, and the issue so significant from a political point of view, that it deserves further investigation something that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Period 1990-1993, the return of New Democracy 6
The political instability of the two-year period 1989-90 and the return to power of New Democracy party reveals that the largest number of prefectures hold the similar position in the two rankings. Figure 4 and Table 3 present the main transitions in the relative positions of the prefectures regarding their participation in national per capita public investment during the period under study.
What stands out immediately and evokes some surprise is that per capita investment in Attiki and Thessaloniki were not only far below average, but drifted further and further being among the lowest in the rankings. Attiki with €137,13 public spending per capita has experienced public investment below the national average by 32% and was ranked 47th, while Thessaloniki with €126,30 showed public investment below the national average by 35% and was ranked 49th. Only five prefectures had per capita public investment below those of Attiki, and only two below Thessaloniki. Thus, an even more substantial downgrading of Attiki -and Thessaloniki-is observed in the rankings in terms of participation in national per capita public investment.
In contrast to the above, there were certain interesting developments in the top places in the ranking. Evrytania with €1000.38 expenditure per capita occupied the first position in the ranking with public investment five times greater than the country average, and seven times greater than those of Attiki. It is clear that Figure 1 .
As previously stated important changes in the ranking should not be expected during the course of four-year period. As can be seen from the transition matrix 21 out of 51 prefectures remain at the same quartile between the two periods.
From the rest 15 were upgraded and 15 were downgraded. However, changes were mild. Thus, although there are no significant changes in the regional distribution of public investment between the current and the previous period, there were certain interesting cases. The intense political competition during this period resulted in the increase of investment in small and electoral decisive prefectures. Indeed, a large number of small, agricultural, border and mountainous prefectures, with a below-average level of economic development, received above-average per capita public investment. Despite the fact that there were certain exceptions, the pattern of supporting the lessdeveloped prefectures was more apparent and marked during this period than in any of the preceding periods. Conversely, the most populated areas of Attiki and Thessaloniki drift further in the ranking. As a result of the above, a greater redistribution effect is observed at this period.
Thus, as a general conclusion it may be said that from a redistribution perspective, this period's policy was more redistributive than all those preceding it. Statistically, the inverse relationship is significant, especially when outliers are removed, and is stronger that in any previous period. This was to a great extent a result of the decline of Attiki's relative position in the country's public investment tables. This may also be related with the fact that many 1st CSF projects were small-scale and applied at a regional level. There might be also a case of inertia, especially for short periods of time. More recently, Mackay (2001: 570) , observed an extremely high correlation between spending in different regions of the U.K. in succeeding years which led him to the conclusion that "History and habit, custom and practice have a powerful impact on public spending. There is inertia. Last year's spending is an excellent guide to this year's and this year's to next year's."
Period 1994-2000, the return of Socialists 8
This period had the following characteristics. Firstly, the period was politically homogeneous, since after 1993 PASOK returned to government and remained in power throughout the period under study. This period also coincided with the implementation of the 2 nd Community Support Framework (1994 Framework ( -1999 . The larger part of the CSF and also funding from the Cohesion Fund was implemented through the Public Investments Budget. The principal aim of economic policy during this period was to meet the requirements, the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, in order to secure the country's participation to the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 9 The aim of this section is to present the regional distribution principle for public investments during this period. The analysis again yields very important findings.
As shown in the Table Id , there was a sharp increase in per capita public investment spending during this period. Nationally, regionally allocated public investment per capita over the period 1994-2000 averaged €261.47, which constitutes an increase of 30%, compared to the preceding period 1990-1993. 10 The sharp increase in the total volume of public investment of that period can be attributed to the increased European funding from the second Community 8 PASOK under Andreas Papandreou won the elections in 1993 and remained in power until 1996 (from October 13, 1993 to January 22, 1996 . His last term was disrupted by health and age, and finally stepped down as Prime Minister and leader of Pasok, and was succeeded by Costas Simitis (January 22, 1996) . Papandreou died on 23rd of June 1996. Pasok under Costas Simitis won the elections in 1996 and 2000 having two consecutive terms in power (March 10, 2004 to April 9, 2000 . 9 In 1998 eleven EU member-states had met the convergence criteria, and the Euro-zone came into existence with the official launch of the Euro on 1 January 1999. Greece qualified in 2000 and was admitted on 1 January 2001. 10 The unallocated amount per capita of that period was €248.40. The total average public investment per capita was €509.90.
Support Framework and the Cohesion Fund. However, this increase was also due to the transferring of funding from the European Social Fund and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-Guidance section, from the Current Expenditure Budget, to the Public Investment Budget. Up to year 1996 these funds had been registered in the Current Expenditure Budget.
11
Having added new programmes in these data it is of some interest to consider the distributional consequences of this increase.
The rank order correlation of .71 shows that there were not significant changes between 1990 -1993 and 1994 -2000 . But comparing 1982 -1989 and 1994 -2000 the coefficient correlation of .56 indicates that between the two decades 1980s
and 1990s there are significant changes in the pattern, comparable to the changes between the 1970s and the 1980s. .
The first point, as can be seen in Table 4 , is that after more than a decade of constant decline, Attiki upgraded its position in the public investment rankings by 15 places, from 47th to 32nd place. Thessaloniki likewise rose by 9 places, from 49th to 40th. This increase in Attiki and Thessaloniki has catalytically affected the pattern of regional distribution for public investment during the period under study. It is clear that, during that period a transition to a more centralist system for the spatial distribution of public investments was taking place, leading to a new polarisation between the two large urban centres and the rest of the country. 11 After the government legislation from the year 1996.
The tendency to strengthen the highly urbanised prefectures appears to be confirmed in the case of Achaia. This prefecture rose by 29 places and reached the 9 th place from the 38 th which it had occupied in the previous period. This development could probably be related to the fact that this prefecture possesses the third largest city in the country, Patras. In addition, the three aforementioned prefectures constitute the basic transport infrastructure nodes in the country, and were given high priority by the 2 nd Community Support There are many interesting conclusions that can be derived from the analysis.
Let us start for the mere observation that total volume of public investment during that period increased dramatically. In per capita terms the average amount was €424.19, an unprecedented increase throughout the 30-year study period. Undoubtedly, the most striking of the several facts is that 55,6% of the total (€10.321million) was invested in Attiki. Attiki with €661.89 public investment per capita was ranked 3rd. Another important feature is that only ten prefectures appreciated public investment above the country's average. The remaining 41 prefectures received below average expenditure support.
However, in absolute terms, a large number of prefectures received substantial support during the period of the Olympic Games, probably through the Greece 2004 programme, which was aiming to finance infrastructures throughout Greece.
The rank order correlation 0.709 reveals that the ranking hasn't changed dramatically. The transition matrix and Table 5 Figure 1 .
In sum, the Olympic Games period has caused an unprecedented increase in 
Overview and conclusions
The main aim of this paper was to shed light into an under-researched area of modern public policy in Greece namely the geographical pattern of public spending. Tracing public investment over a 30-year period is not at all a straightforward issue. This paper represents a great effort to construct one of the longest time series with public investment data ever presented in the literature. This is the most consistent dataset that has ever been constructed on regional spending in Greece. Unpublished data on public investment have been collected from a single official source, guaranteeing consistency. Public investment is expressed in EURO and at constant 2000 prices. The sub-periods are constructed according to the duration of each government in office. Although a government's decision in a set period may have influenced the payment made by another in the following period, the aggregate sums based on a number of years smoothens the trends and gives more plausible results. Having tackled these issues, analysis showed that striking variation exists in the regional allocation of public investment. However, the mere fact of regional variations in per capita public investment is insufficient evidence for judging whether the observed distribution has been 'right' or 'wrong'. The benefit of this paper is that it presents systematically the pattern of public investment allocation in Greece over a long period providing a baseline for further research.
Analysis showed, first, that there are marked inequalities in the flows of public investment across the Greek prefectures. However, there is not a 'clear' pattern for the regional dispersion of public investment in Greece. Neither a NorthSouth/Mainland-Island/Urban-Rural divide nor 'the needs based approach' could carry sufficient explanation for the allocation of public investment.
Analysis by period showed that the picture for the regional allocation of public investment is rather 'patchy'.
Second, contrary to what many researchers have portrayed about history and inertia for the stability of the devolved spending in the UK (Mackay and Williams 2005: 819,826) and 'the remarkable stability' of regional spending pattern in the USA (Anton 1982:430) could be attributed to the Olympic Games. Both had a tremendous influence on the spatial dispersion of public investment but in the opposite direction; the former towards higher dispersion and the latter towards higher concentration.
Third, the level of underdevelopment -and as result redistribution -does not appear to have constantly and systematically comprised the principal criterion to explaining the regional pattern of resource allocation in Greece during the period . When looking at the overall pattern, one might expect that the lower the level of prosperity, the higher the level of public expenditure.
Quite strikingly, however, a large number of lagging behind prefectures in economic development terms had received below-average public investment.
This omission was one of the most important findings of the analysis. Fourth, the policy followed throughout the study period concerning the regional distribution of public investment does not seem to have been dictated by a higher-level strategic regional development plan. For this to have been the case, the government should have systematically monitored and recorded the public capital balance by prefecture, noted potential gaps, omissions, inequalities and needs, and distributed resources accordingly. Sadly, this has not been the case.
In contrast, the regional distribution of public investment seems to be dictated more by faltering, ad hoc interventions based on opportunistic and some times politically myopic criteria, rather than by coordinated interventions dictated by some well-researched plan of recorded needs. Figure 1 .
Last but not least, the regional distribution of public investment seems to be affected by electoral geography. The electoral preferences of prefectures, even the place of origin of certain members of each government, seem to comprise explanatory variables for the regional distribution of public investment. This is consistent with what Mackay and Williams state (Mackay and Williams, 2005: 819) that explaining the pattern 'great weight has to be given to political influences'. Obviously this conclusion requires additional evidence, and cannot be generalised nor substitute for other factors, which in conjunction with it, contribute to a better understanding of the regional distribution of public investment in Greece. 
